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EXPLAINING ENGINEERED COMPUTING SYSTEMS’ BEHAVIOUR: 




This paper addresses the methodological problem of analysing what it is to explain 
observed behaviours of engineered computing systems (BECS), focusing on the crucial 
role that abstraction and idealization play in explanations of both correct and incorrect 
BECS. First, it is argued that an understanding of explanatory requests about observed 
miscomputations crucially involves reference to the rich background afforded by 
hierarchies of functional specifications. Second, many explanations concerning 
incorrect BECS are found to abstract away (and profitably so on account of both 
relevance and intelligibility of the explanans) from descriptions of physical components 
and processes of computing systems that one finds below the logic circuit and gate 
layer of functional specification hierarchies. Third, model-based explanations of both 
correct and incorrect BECS that are provided in the framework of formal verification 
methods often involve idealizations. Moreover, a distinction between restrictive and 
permissive idealizations is introduced and their roles in BECS explanations are 
analyzed.  
Keywords: Philosophy of computer science · Miscomputation · Explanation · Abstraction · 
Idealization  
1. Introduction 
Engineered computing systems form a vast class of physical systems, comprising laptops and 
personal computers, high performance computing systems and worldwide networks of other 
general purpose machines, controllers of vending machines and special purpose computing 
devices embedded into smart phones, household appliances, robots, and myriads of other hybrid 
systems comprising both computing and non-computing subsystems. Computer scientists analyze 
the behaviour of computing systems before releasing them into the market; and after release they 
monitor their behaviour for a wide variety of purposes. In particular, computer scientists regularly 
engage in the activity of evaluating whether the behaviour of engineered computing systems 
(BECS) conforms to, or fails to comply with, the various requirements set out by their users, 
programmers, producers, and other stakeholders. Accordingly, explaining BECS is a pervasive 
activity in computer science. 
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The methodological problem of analyzing what it is to explain BECS has received relatively scarce 
attention in the philosophy of computer science.1 Interestingly, the philosophy of computer 
science entry (Turner 2014a) of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy mentions the word 
‘explanation’ only once in connection with so-called inferences to the best explanation. Fresco and 
Primiero (2013) remark that “whilst some attention has been given to the ontology of 
computational objects in philosophy of computer science, the methodology of their explanation 
has not yet been sufficiently investigated”(p. 255). Notable efforts to fill this gap include an 
analysis of computer science explanations as causal-mechanistic explanations (Piccinini 2007; 
Piccinini and Craver 2011; Piccinini 2015) and an analysis of incorrect executions of computing 
systems and their explanations (Fresco and Primiero 2013; Floridi et al. 2014).  This article aims to 
contribute to analyses of explanation in computer science with an examination of the crucial role 
that abstraction and idealization play in explanations of both correct and incorrect executions of 
engineered computing systems. Moreover, it is worth pointing out that the ensuing analysis is 
exclusively concerned with engineered computing systems. It is beyond the scope of this article to 
address the question of how behaviours of computing systems that are not human artefacts are 
best explained.    
The central role of abstraction in computer science explanations is highlighted by means of a 
straightforward example from the intricate landscape of BECS. This example concerns 
miscomputations by a general purpose digital computer running offline a stored program written 
in some high-level programming language. Explanations concerning incorrect behaviours of this 
computing system are usually advanced against the background of what-how hierarchies of 
functional specifications (section 2). At the top layer of these hierarchies one finds user 
specifications about what the computing system is expected to do. These functional specifications 
are broken down into sets of progressively more elementary  specifications as one moves 
downward along the what-how hierarchy.  
The bottom layer in what-how hierarchies provides a description of physical components of the 
computing system (e.g. transistors) and a description of the processes they engage into that is 
couched in the language of physical theory. It turns out that correct, parsimonious, and intelligible 
explanations of miscomputations  are in many circumstances profitably advanced without 
                                                          
1 This neglect is at odds with a rising interest in methodological analyses of explanation in other areas of technological 
inquiry (see for instance Pitt 2011 and van Eck 2015). 
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mentioning descriptions of physical entities and processes that one finds at this bottom layer of 
the what-how hierarchy (section 3). The crucial role of abstraction in explanation can be expressed 
in the language of mechanistic approaches to explanation (Glennan 1996; Machamer et al. 2000; 
Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005) by stating that in many circumstances mechanism schemata 
enable one to achieve correct, parsimonious, and intelligible explanations of miscomputations 
without having to fill in their functionally characterized causal roles by making direct reference to 
specific physical entities and processes (Boone and Piccinini 2016).  
Clearly, there are many other BECS explanation problems where an adequate explanans cannot be 
identified by abstracting away from descriptions of physical components and processes of 
computing systems that one finds at the bottom layer of what-how hierarchies. A significant case 
in point are explanations of incorrect BECS arising from hardware malfunctions with respect to the 
functional specifications of logic circuits and gates, where selective reference must be made to 
physical role fillers and their processes. However, parsimonious causal models abstracting from 
structural details concerning the continuous trajectories in the state spaces of the physical role 
fillers are to be preferred there too (section 4).  
Abstractions come with idealizations in some classes of BECS explanations. Idealization is the 
practice of representing a target system counterfactually with the explicit aim of simplifying the 
examination of some phenomenon pertaining to such system. Idealizations are usually introduced 
by either listing some set of ceteris paribus clauses that are assumed to hold (Cartwright 1989) or 
by directly including  false assumptions into a model (Nowak 1979; McMullin 1985). Idealization 
practices are as such distinct from abstractions, in that the latter involve the removal of data that 
are not required to examine the target phenomenon without necessarily introducing distortions in 
its representation (Cartwright 1989; Jones 2005). The combination of abstractions and 
idealizations in BECS explanations is investigated here in the context of reactive computing 
systems interacting with their environment (section 5). In particular, model-based explanations of 
both correct and incorrect BECS that are provided on the basis of formal model checking (Baier 
and Katoen 2008) are often found to involve significant idealizations. There, the observed 
behaviour of some reactive system S satisfying a certain property Q is explained on the basis of an 
abstract model of S involving spurious computation paths, that is, paths which do not represent 
potential executions of system S. The presence of spurious computation paths in the model does 
not jeopardize the correctness of the explanation unless they correspond to counterexamples 
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showing a violation of the checked property Q, often called false negatives. This paper investigates 
the combined effect of abstraction and idealization, which prevents some downward expansions 
of what-how hierarchies: while abstraction hides elements of lower-level descriptions, idealization 
makes the inclusion of those elements impossible.  
2. Specifications and their what-how hierarchies 
Why was an incorrect output observed in this particular run of program P on personal computer C? 
This question expresses an explanation request about an observed behaviour of personal 
computer C executing (or running) program P. This explanation request presupposes the existence 
of norms for executions (or runs) of program P on C insofar as the observed behaviour is qualified 
as incorrect. Therefore, in order to understand what it is to answer adequately the above 
question, a preliminary task is to identify the behavioural norms that are presupposed in the 
explanation request. 
Prospective users are a chief source of computing systems’ behavioural norms. Typically, users ask 
programmers to fulfil some of their goals and intentions. Thus, for example, bank executives 
express the interests of both their company and its clients when they require that an e-banking 
program must always verify the PIN of bank account holders before accepting and processing 
transaction orders. In explaining why some executions of an e-banking program P conform with 
(or deviate from) user requirements one is ipso facto explaining why certain human goals and 
intentions are (or are not) fulfilled in those runs of P. 
Requirements on computer programs that are advanced by users, programmers, producers, and 
various other stakeholders are usually called specifications (Turner 2011). Specifications emerge at 
various stages of the composite process of designing, developing, programming, testing, and 
revising computing systems. Programmers expand and unfold user specifications through iterated 
cycles of program development, testing and revision. In the course of this process, one may even 
undertake to modify user specifications that turn out to be difficult or even impossible to comply 
with (Primiero and Raimondi 2015). Deviations from user requirements detected in some run of 
program P count as failures of P relative to that particular requirement (Fresco and Primiero 2013). 
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More generally, the entire set of stakeholder requirements on runs of P determines whether in 
any given execution there are failures of P.2 
Usually, user specifications concern what is to be accomplished (or avoided) without saying much 
about how this is to be done. Accordingly, programmers must choose one among the alternative 
courses of action that are available to fulfil user specifications. Thus, by selecting Java, Pascal, C++ 
or some other high-level programming language L for writing a program, programmers introduce 
additional constraints on how to fulfil user intentions, including the identification of the primitive 
instructions that the virtual machine associated to L can carry out. The primitive instructions of L 
contribute to determine how programmers intend to fulfil the what expressing user intentions and 
goals. In turn, the programmer’s “how” with respect to some user “what” becomes an additional 
“what” specification for the tasks of translating into machine language, and eventually running on 
some computing system, the high-level instructions of L figuring in P. 
In computer architecture textbooks one finds several layers or levels of functional organization 
descriptions, jointly forming a hierarchy of layers induced by a binary what-how relationship. 
Tanenbaum (2006, pp. 2-8) describes computing systems with as many as six hierarchically 
organized layers. At the bottom level, one finds descriptions of logical gates and circuits. At a 
higher level one finds a description of the microarchitecture, which includes functional 
specifications of registers forming a local memory and of the distinguished circuit called Arithmetic 
Logic Unit (ALU). Still ascending in the stratified architecture, but well before getting at the top 
layer of programs written in high-level programming languages, one finds the so-called Instruction 
Set Architecture (or ISA) layer, describing instructions that are, on the one hand, more elementary 
than those that are written in any high-level programming language and, on the other hand, less 
elementary than assembly language instructions. 
Turner (2011; 2014b) points out that the descriptions one finds at each layer in what-how 
hierarchies are to be identified with functional prescriptions for computing systems. For example, 
any Pascal program is a text expressing must-prescriptions for the behaviour of a computing 
system running that program. And these must-prescriptions bring with them a cascade of 
                                                          
2 Floridi, Fresco and Primiero (2015) distinguish between a dysfunction, an artefact’s behaviour not complying with 
user specifications, and a misfunction, an artefact’s behaviour which does comply with its specifications but is 
nevertheless prone to bring about undesired side effects. The authors emphasize how “the misfunction of an  artifact 
token may be due to a dysfunction of some component” (p. 1209). Accordingly, explaining a misfunction of computing 
systems amounts to explaining a dysfunction of some given component of the system on the basis of the relevant 
specifications which ought to be fulfilled by such component. 
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additional must-prescriptions for the same computing system at lower layers in the hierarchy. One 
should be careful to note that the must-prescriptions one finds at any one of these layers are 
solely concerned with functionally characterized properties of computing systems (Turner 2014b). 
As we shall see, it turns out that abstraction from descriptions of physical components and 
processes of computing systems that one finds below the logic circuit and gate layer plays a crucial 
role in many BECS explanations. Indeed, abstractions of this sort enable one to eliminate irrelevant 
causal information and to achieve greater intelligibility without losing in explanatory force. Let us 
examine in some detail this role of abstraction in connection with the problem of explaining some 
given incorrect BECS.  
3. Abstraction in explanations of incorrect BECS 
Consider some program P which is supposed to compute on a personal computer the factorial 
function 𝑛!, whose recursive definition is given by the following equations: 
0! = 1  
(𝑛 + 1)! = (𝑛 + 1) ∗  𝑛! 
A programmer may decide to expand this specification into a program by means of the following 
pseudo-Pascal code P: 
1   𝐵𝐸𝐺𝐼𝑁 
2      𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 (𝑛); 
3      𝑖 ≔ 0; 
4      𝑓 ≔ 1; 
5      𝑊𝐻𝐼𝐿𝐸 𝑖 < 𝑛 𝐷𝑂 
6         𝐵𝐸𝐺𝐼𝑁 
7            𝑖 ≔ 𝑖 + 1; 
9            𝑓 ≔ 𝑓 ∗ 𝑖; 
10       𝐸𝑁𝐷 
11    𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝑓 
12  𝐸𝑁𝐷 
P expresses functional must-prescriptions that are inherited at lower levels in the what-how 
hierarchy which is induced by P and includes the assembly language code layer. In the MIPS 
architecture (Patterson and Hennessy 2013), this layer is characterized by 32 registers. Of these 
$𝑠0, $𝑠1, … , $𝑠7 are registers for program variables, $𝑡0, $𝑡1, … , $𝑡9 are additional temporary 
registers that are needed to translate a high-level language program into an assembly language 
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program, and $𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜 is a register which is always set to zero. Suppose the compiler, while 
translating the program for the factorial function, assigns 𝑛 to register $𝑠0 and 𝑖 to register $𝑠1. 
Then, line 5 of P is translated into the following assembly language instructions:  
5.1     𝑠𝑙𝑡   $𝑡0, $𝑠1, $𝑠0 
5.2     𝑏𝑒𝑞   $𝑡0, $𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜, 𝐿1 
MIPS computes the value of the inequality condition by means of instruction 𝑠𝑙𝑡 (‘set on less 
than’) which is composed of three fields: the first field denotes a temporary register which is set to 
1 in case the value contained in the register in the second field is less than the value assigned to 
the register in the third field, and to 0 otherwise. Assembly instruction 5.1 above sets $t0 to 1 in 
case 𝑖 < 𝑛, and to 0 otherwise. Assembly instruction 5.2 subsequently checks the value of $t0 by 
the MIPS instruction beq (‘branch if equal’) which leads to instruction labelled (by the compiler) L1 
in case the value contained in $t0 is equal to the value contained in $zero, i.e. if it equals 0. 
The two assembly language instructions above provide in their turn functional “what” 
specifications for machine-code instructions, defined by binary digits that are storable into 
memory. In MIPS, the number of bits per instructions and data is 32. Assembly instruction 5.1 is 
translated into the following six-field machine-code instruction  
5.2.1        000000   10001   10000   01000   00000   101010 
                                                   op              rs              rt              rd         shamt         funct 
The operating code (op) field, jointly with the last field funct, express that this is an arithmetic 
instruction, specifically a set on less than instruction. Fields op and funct instruct the main 
combinatory element of the processor, the ALU, to evaluate an inequality. Fields rs and rt refer to 
the source register and the target register containing the operands with respect to which the ALU 
has to evaluate inequality (10001 is the binary code for $𝑠1 and 10000 for $𝑠0). The five bits of 
field rd point to the destination register $𝑡0, that is, the temporary register that must be set to 1 if 
the inequality holds and to 0 otherwise. Fields rs, rt, and rd refer to the Register File in the 
processor (a state element collecting 32 registers which can be either read or written).3 
Before getting to lower levels of the what-how hierarchy, let us suppose that the computing 
system C running P manifested the following incorrect BECS with respect to user specifications: C 
                                                          
3 The shift amount field, named shamt and usually involved in data transfer and conditional-branch instructions, refers 




outputted some value 𝑘, with 𝑘 ≠ 𝑚!, when 𝑚 was given as input. As was emphasized in section 
2, the what-how hierarchy outlined so far supplies one with a set of functional specifications 
(Turner 2014b) against which one may look for an explanation of the observed incorrect BECS. 
Downward movements along this hierarchy correspond to the breaking down of higher-level 
specifications into sets of progressively more elementary  specifications. Thus, in particular, the 
recursive definition of n!, and the capacities that are required to compute n! in accordance with 
that definition, are analyzed into specifications provided by means of the Pascal program 
instructions and the capacities that the corresponding virtual machine must be endowed with in 
order to carry them out. These specifications are in their turn broken down in terms of detailed 
assembly language instructions until one reaches, further down along the what-how hierarchy, the 
logic circuit and gate layer.  
Candidate explanations for the observed miscomputation can be identified by selecting, in a what-
how hierarchy, the higher-level functional specification that fails to provide a correct how 
decomposition for a what prescription that one finds at the next upper level in the hierarchy. To 
exemplify, one might summon an incorrect recursive definition of the factorial function at the top 
level of the hierarchy – where, say, the first recursion equation reads 0! = 2 instead of 0! = 1 – as 
an erroneously conceived specification of the factorial function. 4 This is a perfectly adequate 
explanation of the observed BECS provided that the incorrect specification expressed as a recursive 
definition is inherited throughout the lower hierarchical levels. If this ceteris paribus assumption 
holds, no additional explanatory force is achieved by mentioning any lower-level functional or 
structural properties. Descriptions of functional roles or their causal role fillers one may find at 
lower levels are selectively concerned with causal factors that do not ‘make a difference’ (Strevens 
2008) in explaining the observed miscomputation under the above ceteris paribus assumption.  
Those causal factors do make a difference in explaining why the observed computation occurred, 
but they fail to make any difference in explaining why such computation is incorrect. The reason is 
that the factorial recursive definition is itself a specification for lower levels: lower levels simply 
add information about how the incorrect specification is instantiated without adding difference-
making what-details about its incorrectness. This, we argue, is a crucial feature of BECS 
explanations which is rooted in the richly layered structure of what-how hierarchies of functional 
specifications for engineered computing systems.  
                                                          
4 In the taxonomy provided by Fresco and Primiero (2013), miscomputation engendered by wrongly conceived 
specifications are called mistakes. 
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Supposing that the recursive equations correctly define the factorial function, an explanation of 
the observed incorrect BECS might be alternatively found by moving downward along the what-
how hierarchy and looking for Pascal code errors. Thus, a program debugger might point to an 
error in, say, code line 5 – which reads 𝑊𝐻𝐼𝐿𝐸 𝑖 ⩽ 𝑛 𝐷𝑂 instead of  𝑊𝐻𝐼𝐿𝐸 𝑖 < 𝑛 𝐷𝑂5– to 
explain an observed incorrect BECS. Clearly, explanations appealing to some program code error 
only – without mentioning lower-level functional roles and their causal role fillers – presuppose 
that the identified program code error is inherited throughout lower hierarchical levels.  
If there are no errors in the Pascal code, one may look for an explanation of the observed incorrect 
BECS by proceeding further down along the what-how hierarchy. There, the functional 
specification expressed by means of Pseudo-Pascal instruction 5 can be further analyzed in terms 
of, say, MIPS assembly language instructions 5.1 and 5.2 and their corresponding machine code 
instructions.  
Let us now briefly consider some implications of the above remarks about BECS explanations, as 
these can be plausibly construed in the framework of causal-mechanistic models of explanation 
(Piccinini 2007; Piccinini and Craver 2011; Piccinini 2015). For our present purposes, a mechanism 
is identified with a set of “entities and activities organized such that they are productive of regular 
changes from start or set-up to finish or termination condition” (Machamer et al. 2000, p. 3), and 
a mechanistic explanation of some empirical phenomenon with some description of the 
mechanism that brings about that phenomenon. A full-fledged description of an actual mechanism 
is usually distinguished from a mechanism schema, that is, “a truncated abstract description of a 
mechanism that can be filled with descriptions of known component parts and activities” 
(Machamer et al. 2000, p. 15); and the latter is in turn distinguished from a mechanism sketch, “an 
abstraction for which bottom out entities and activities cannot (yet) be supplied or which contains 
gaps in its stages”. (p. 18).  
Clearly, the candidate BECS explanations outlined above are not based on a full-fledged 
description of an actual mechanism. More specifically, only functional roles for causal fillers in the 
computational mechanism are used to explain some incorrect BECS. This fact does not unveil a 
weakness of the candidate BECS explanations insofar as no explanatory benefit is accrued by 
supplementing the description of an actual functional mismatch between, say, user requirement R 
and program instruction I with a description that one finds at lower layers of the what-how 
                                                          
5 Syntax encoding errors count as slips in Fresco and Primiero’s (2013) terminology. 
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hierarchy of physical processes by means of which the incorrect specification I is actually carried 
out.  If the incorrect specification is inherited downward all the way through the what-how 
hierarchy, these additional descriptions merely introduce non-difference-making information into 
a more parsimonious explanans. Indeed, it is not always the case that if there is a mismatch 
between R and I then some constraint is violated at lower levels too. Causal role fillers in lower-
level mechanistic details do not play a significant evidential role in this explanatory context – as 
long as no information is available that some constraint has been violated at lower levels of the 
what-how hierarchy. Thus, according to any reasonable construal of the notion of explanatory 
force, no additional explanatory force is ceteris paribus accrued by supplementing the functional 
mismatch description with additional information that one finds downward along some suitable 
what-how hierarchy.  Moreover, from a cognitive perspective, the inclusion of non-difference-
making causal details may jeopardize the intelligibility of explanantia. Therefore, abstraction from 
causally irrelevant functional or structural details is an explanatory virtue in computer science.  
A significant class of explanations in computer science are solely based on abstract mechanism 
schemata; and the process of filling in these “truncated abstract descriptions” of mechanisms  
“with descriptions of known component parts and activities” (Machamer et al. 2000, p. 15)  is not 
pursued for good reasons of explanatory adequacy and intelligibility. Machamer et al. (2000) 
underline how “bottoming out is relative”(p. 13), that is, there is no a-priori bottom mechanistic 
level in natural phenomena. Bottom levels are identified with mechanisms involved in the 
explanandum phenomenon (where lower mechanisms are not). In the case of the candidate 
explanantia of the observed miscomputation analysed in this section, one already knows that 
there are bottoming out mechanisms insofar as those explanantia are provided by specifications 
imposing what-constraints on lower specification layers in what-how hierarchies. 
The conclusion that abstraction from descriptions that one finds at lower layers of the what-how 
hierarchy does not invariably come with a diminished explanatory force of BECS explanations 
converges with similar conclusions about explanations in psychology (Barrett 2014) and in 
biological modelling  (Levy and Bechtel 2013), about the explanatory role of functional constraints 
in mechanistic explanations (Piccinini and Craver 2011) and about the role of abstraction in 
adequate mechanistic explanations (Boone and Piccinini 2016). In particular, Boone and Piccinini 
(2016) distinguish between epistemic roles and ontic roles of abstraction in mechanistic 
explanations.  Mechanism schemata are adequate explanations when epistemically motivated by 
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the choice of a specific level of organization of the involved mechanism. And epistemically 
motivated abstractions are often used to explain misfunctions of mechanisms by identifying some 
faulty properties of the mechanism and omitting causal details concerning proper functioning. 
Specifications in the what-how hierarchy that fail to correctly instantiate requirements that one 
finds higher up in the hierarchy are schemata of computing mechanisms providing  adequate 
explanations of occurred miscomputations. Indeed, one is identifying the appropriate mechanism 
organization level wherein some required property of the underlying mechanism is not satisfied, 
while avoiding reference to lower functional and causal details concerning satisfied properties of 
the mechanism. 
4. Role filling and the useful idealization of digital behaviour 
 Higher-level descriptions cannot be always insulated in BECS explanations from lower-level 
descriptions  that one finds in what-how hierarchies. Clearly, if hardware malfunctions are the 
source of an incorrect program run, then an adequate explanation of the observed BECS must 
summon descriptions of the malfunctioning physical components. In that case, one must proceed 
downward along the what-how hierarchy, reaching the descriptions that one finds at the logic 
circuit and gate layer and further down to the descriptions of physical role fillers for logic circuit 
and gate functions. Before considering an instance of hardware malfunction and its candidate 
explanations, let us first unfold some of the functional specifications provided above for the 
factorial function, all the way down to the logic circuit and gate layer. 
Code instruction 5.2.1 examined in section 3 can be functionally analyzed in the framework of a 
MIPS architecture (Figure 1) in terms of state and combinatory elements corresponding to the six 
fields appearing in that instruction (Patterson Hennessy 2013, p. 248). For example, state (or 
memory) elements represented in Figure 1 include the Register File, the data/instruction Memory, 
the Program Counter (PC) containing the address of the instruction to be executed next, and 
additional registers saving data from input registers that have to be processed in the immediately 
following clock cycle.6 These additional registers include the Instruction Register, the Memory 
Data Register, registers A and B inputted from the Register File, and the ALU Out register receiving 
as inputs values computed by the ALU (see Figure 1). The Arithmetic Logic Unit (ALU) in Figure 1 is 
a combinatory element.  
                                                          
6 In MIPS implementations, at each clock cycle of the processor, new data are written in all registers (whereas data 
can be read anytime). 
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Instruction 5.3.1 takes four clock cycles to be executed by the processor in Figure 1. At the first 
clock cycle the instruction is picked up from memory using the memory address contained in PC; 
the instruction is saved in the Instruction Register so that it will not be lost before the next clock 
cycle; and PC is incremented so as to point to the address of the next instruction. At the second 
clock cycle, fields rs and rt  in the machine code instruction ($𝑠1 and $𝑠0 in the Register File) are 
read; the values contained there are saved in registers A and B to be used in the next clock cycle. 
At the third clock cycle, fields op and funct are read to let the ALU compute the corresponding 
mathematical operation; in the present case the ALU verifies the inequality between the values 
inputted from register A and B, outputting 1 in case the first value is less than the second value 
and 0 otherwise. The value is saved in the additional register ALU Out. During the last clock cycle, 
the destination register in rd, in this case $𝑡0, is used to save the value in ALU Out. 
 
Fig. 1 A MIPS architecture. 
This is plainly a description of a computing mechanism (Piccinini and Craver 2011): state elements 
and combinatory elements involved in the description, and described in Figure 1, are defined in 
terms of functional units (Patterson and Hennessy 2013, p. 245), that is, black boxes which satisfy 
certain input-output relations. The Registers box at the centre of Figure 1 is  given there as a black-
box characterized by two input lines specifying the number of the two operand registers to be 
read, two output lines for the two read values which have to be stored in the additional registers A 
and B, and two input lines for the data to be stored in the destination register – the first one 
specifying the register number and the second one sending the data to be saved. The MIPS 
register file is functionally analyzed in terms of the organization of the 32 registers composing it. 
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And each register is in turn functionally analyzed in terms of flip-flops functional organization. 
Consider now, as a simple kind of flip-flop, the S-R latch of figure 2.7  
 
Fig. 2 An S-R latch. 
This basic memory element is functionally characterized in terms of two input lines, S (set) and R 
(reset), and two output lines, 𝑄 and its complement ?̅?.  It is obtained by suitably composing two 
NOR logic gates. In S-R latches, when S is affirmed, 𝑄 is affirmed and ?̅? is not affirmed. When S 
stops being affirmed, 𝑄 keeps being affirmed. When R is affirmed, ?̅? is affirmed, 𝑄 is not affirmed, 
and  ?̅? keeps on holding when R stops being affirmed. 
Figure 2 describes functional roles, specified in terms of input-output (I/O) relations, that any 
physical device must satisfy in order to count as a physical role filler for an S-R latch. In current 
computing systems, one generally uses sets of properly integrated transistors as physical role 
fillers for S-R latches and the NOR logic gates that are involved.  The identification of  a single 
transistor in this set which fails to make the state transitions that are associated with some I/O 
relationship in the functional specification of an S-R latch may suffice to explain a variety of 
incorrect BECS that are observed.8 In this case too, one is identifying the higher layer in the what-
how hierarchy which fails to satisfy some functional requirements  that have been inherited 
downward throughout the hierarchy. One should be careful to note that this layer – which is the 
higher one from the viewpoint of functional requirement violation – happens to coincide with the 
bottom layer of the what-how hierarchy. This is a relevant circumstance for explanations that one 
builds by reference to the descriptions that one finds in this layer. Indeed, unlike the explanations 
discussed in the previous section, the explanation advanced for violations of the functional must-
prescription for the S-R latch does make direct reference to physical role fillers that are expected 
to fulfil that must-prescription.  
The explanation advanced for violations of the S-R latch functional must-prescription turns out to 
be a parsimonious explanation which can hardly achieve greater explanatory force by including 
                                                          
7 S-R latches do not take into consideration clock signals, so they are not, technically speaking, flip-flops. However, for 
the sake of simplicity, only S-R latches are considered here. 
8 This is an operational malfunction in Fresco and Primiero’s (2013) taxonomy. 
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additional causal details about the behaviour of (incorrectly or properly working) transistors 
implementing  the S-R latches. Let us explain. 
The class of potential role fillers is circumscribed in the above functional specification of an S-R 
latch simply by requiring that any physical role filler must possess distinguished states to be 
conventionally associated to one value from the set {0, 1}, and that suitable Boolean functional 
conditions must be satisfied for state transitions in the same set. Accordingly, these functional 
specifications of an S-R latch involve the use of a finite collection of discrete variables only. 
However, the orbits and state space trajectories of transistors and other devices (e. g. vacuum 
tubes) that are used as role fillers for functional specifications of S-R latches and logic gates are 
described in classical physics by means of continuous – rather than discrete – macroscopic 
variables.9 As a consequence, a plurality of non-isomorphic logical models satisfy the above 
functional specifications for S-R latches and logic gates. The domain of some of these models is a 
state space formed by a non-countable set of states; the domain of some other models satisfying 
the same specifications is a state space formed instead by a finite set of states. In models of the 
former type, any switching transition between states representing the S-R latch values 0 and 1 is 
described by means of a continuous trajectory in the state space. In models of the latter kind, the 
same switch is described as an instantaneous change involving no intermediate state whatsoever. 
Accordingly, in order to explain hardware malfunctions by reference to the logic circuit and gate 
layer one can often dispense, and profitably so, with models involving uncountable domains and 
continuous trajectories in the state space, relying instead on models allowing for instantaneous  
transitions between states representing the values 0 and 1, respectively. Indeed, by mentioning 
idealised digital behaviours and by simplifying accordingly the causal story that one may provide 
about the behaviour of transistors in terms of classical physics, one focuses on the violation of the 
relevant functional specifications at the logic circuit and gate layer by some S-R latch physical role 
filler. If the explanatory goal is to identify in the faulty hardware component the causes of the 
functional prescription violation, no additional explanatory force is accrued by providing a detailed 
description, in the framework of (classical) physical theories, of how that faulty hardware 
component brings about the incorrect behaviour in question.  Those causal details turn out to be 
irrelevant in that they do not make a difference in the violation of the S-R latch specification. The 
                                                          
9 See (Trautteur and Tamburrini 2007, and especially pp. 107-108) for a discussion of the discrete-continuous polarity 




core factors (Weisberg 2007) causing the violation of the involved specifications are to be 
identified here with failures to make transitions between states that are abstractly described as 
states 0 and 1  in accordance with the S-R latch specification. Any other states in the continuous 
trajectory are causal factors contributing to bring about the transistor’s behaviour, but they do not 
make any difference with respect to the classification of  the observed behaviour as incorrect. 
One should be careful to note that, by providing explanations of incorrect BECS by reference to 
idealised digital behaviours of hardware components satisfying the laws of classical physics, one is 
making use of idealizations in explanation (Weisberg 2007). The use of idealizations for explaining 
both incorrect and correct BECS is a widespread practice in computer science, which comprises as 
a particular case the idealizations involved in the conceptual shift from a continuous to a discrete 
dynamics in connection with descriptions of the behaviour of physical components of computing 
systems. Prominent examples of a different sort, that we now turn to examine, are found in 
explanations of BECS relying on specification and verification methods developed in theoretical 
computer science.  
5. Combining abstraction and idealization in BECS explanations 
Many computing systems of interest in computer science are appropriately qualified as reactive 
systems, that is, as systems interacting with their environment. A relatively simple case in point 
are controllers of beverage vending machines, which interact with an unlimited sequence of users, 
recognize their requests, and distribute beverages accordingly as long as they are properly 
maintained and supplied with beverages as needed. Additional examples of simple reactive 
systems are controllers of household micro-wave ovens and controllers of traffic light junctions 
interacting with pedestrian requests.  
Formal verification methods in theoretical computer science enable one to provide explanations 
for both correct and incorrect BECS manifested by reactive systems on the basis of suitably 
specified models of those systems. An examination of these models enables one to advance and 
support the claim that many explanations of reactive systems’ behaviours involve an extensive use 
of both abstraction and idealizations. On the one hand, abstraction hides the details of some 
lower-level descriptions (Coulburn and Shute 2007). On the other hand, idealization makes the 
inclusion of some lower-level descriptions impossible. Both abstraction and idealization are 
introduced with the aim of offsetting the impact of complexity limitations on the applicability of 
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formal verification to predict and explain the behaviour of reactive systems. Here, we consider  
interactions between abstraction and idealization in the context of model checking formal 
verification methods (Baier and Katoen 2008; Clarke et al. 1999) and their implications for BECS 
explanations. 
Model checking enables one to verify whether the unending runs of some reactive system R 
satisfy, according to a suitable model M of R, properties that are decidable (and efficiently so) in 
M. Decidable properties of reactive systems that are of interest for system users, programmers, 
and various other stakeholders, include safety, invariant, and liveliness properties. Safety 
statements assert that states possessing some undesired feature are unreachable in any run of R, 
invariant statements assert that all reachable states satisfy some desired feature, and liveness 
statements assert that states satisfying some desired feature are eventually always reachable from 
any state of R. Model checking allows one to explain why a reactive computing system reached (or 
did not reach) a desired/undesired state by showing a computational path in the model starting 
from some initial state and going through (or not going through) the desired/undesired state. In 
case of explanations of miscomputations, those paths are often used to trace back error states in 
the running program code (see, for instance, Callahan et al. 1996). 
Let us concretely consider the case of a micro-wave oven controller, and suppose one would like 
to check the liveness property that whenever the oven is on, it will eventually start heating. For 
this verification purpose, one may develop a model abstracting from many features of the actual 
computing system which controls the oven.  A model consisting of eight states only will do – with 
each state represented by a circle, arrows between states representing transitions between them, 
and initial states represented as circles pointed to by an arrow incoming from an unspecified 
source. Each one of the represented states is an abstract macrostate obtained by collapsing, into 
one state, many actual states of the micro-wave oven controller. Abstract macrostates are 
obtained by a data abstraction function mapping variables appearing in more fine-grained 
representations of the controller into some macro-variables. The functional properties of macro-
states that one needs in order to check the desired liveness property can be represented as atomic 
propositions start, ¬ start,  close , ¬close,  heat, ¬heat, error, ¬error.10 The resulting model can be 
represented as the state transition diagram of Figure 3.  
                                                          
10 The example is taken from Clarke et al. (1999, pp. 38-39). 
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The state transition diagram of Figure 3 can be viewed as a Kripke Structure (KS) 𝑀 = (𝑆, 𝑆0, 𝑅, 𝐿) 
defined by states in 𝑆 with a subset of initial states 𝑆0, the transition relation 𝑅 = 𝑆 𝑥 𝑆, and a 
labelling function 𝐿: 𝑆 → 2𝐴𝑃 labelling each state with subset of a fixed set 𝐴𝑃 of atomic 
propositions that are true in that state (Clarke et. al  1999, pp. 13-26). Abstract KSs of the kind 
depicted in Figure 3 enable one to model the multiple processes that are concurrently executed by 
a machine while carrying out a given task. Causal interactions among those processes can be 
represented in an abstract model by means of compositions of different state transition systems - 













Fig. 3: An abstract model for verifying a liveness property of a micro-wave oven. 
In order to check whether the KS model satisfies the property one is interested in, the latter is 
usually formalised by means of a temporal logic formula. The liveness property that whenever the 
oven is on, it will eventually start heating can be formalized in Computation Tree Logic (CTL) by 
                                                          
11Kripke Structures have been more explicitly used to represent causal structures (see for instance Alur, McMillan, and 
Peled 1998, p. 45). More in general, checking KSs against specified temporal formulas can be useful to infer causal 
relations from temporal data (Kleinberg 2012).  
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means of the formula 𝑨𝑮  (𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 →  𝑨𝑭 𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑡). This formula states that in all paths (A) starting 
from any initial state, and in every state (globally: 𝑮) of those paths, if Start holds then in all paths 
(A) starting from there Heat will finally (F) hold. The model checking technique makes use of a 
depth-first search algorithm to explore the state space of a KS (or model) M and to check whether  
𝑀 ⊨ 𝑓, that is, whether the temporal ordering constraints on program behaviours that are 
expressed by a formula 𝑓are satisfied by model M. In the micro-wave example, the model 
checking algorithm enables one to check whether 𝑀 ⊨  𝑨𝑮 (𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 →  𝑨𝑭 𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑡) or not. In case 
of a positive answer, the algorithm outputs a set of “witnesses”, that is, of paths in the KS that 
fulfil the checked properties. And in case of a negative answer, “counterexamples”12 are advanced 
by the algorithm, which consist of paths in the model violating the temporal logic formula. 
In model checking an abstract description of the functional organization of the system is provided 
in terms of macrostates and transitions between them (e. g. the microwave oven KS). Many 
elements that would occur in a complete description of the system are irrelevant for prediction 
and explanation purposes (its microstates). In particular, interactions between these components 
in a fine-grained system’s description (microstates and their transition conditions) do not make a 
difference in explaining a wide variety of the system’s temporal ordering properties holding 
among the specified macrostates. The adopted explanation strategy is based on an abstract model 
(that is, the KS viewed as an abstract model) which shares many distinctive aspects with scientific 
models that are used in the empirical sciences for predictive and explanatory purposes (Angius 
and Tamburrini 2011). If a system is functionally organized as specified in the KS, then it must 
possess the reachability, safety, liveness properties that hold of the KS, and whose instances one 
can observe in the system’s behaviour. Thus, one explains both complex behavioural regularities 
(reachability, safety, liveliness, etc) and their instances by reference to the state transition 
trajectories that are permitted or forbidden by the abstract description of the computing 
mechanism (Piccinini 2015).  
In addition to abstraction, idealizations (Nowak 1979; Cartwright 1989; Weisberg 2007) are 
extensively introduced to build models in model checking. Abstraction and idealization, which are 
introduced to simplify empirical models for representational or explanatory purposes, usually 
                                                          
12 Paths in the model violating the temporal logic formula are identifiable with counterexamples under the assumption 
that model M provides a correct representation of the reactive system for the specific verification purpose at hand. 
This crucial assumption can be empirically controlled by starting the reactive system under suitable initial conditions 
and verifying  whether the runs that are actually observed are correctly modelled by those paths in the model which 
violate the temporal logic formula according to the model checking algorithm. 
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interact with each other in the construction of simplified models. In the following, interactions 
between abstraction and idealization are examined in the context of model checking  by reference 
to the micro-oven controller example. In particular, a distinction between restrictive and 
permissive idealizations is introduced and their respective impact on BECS explanations is 
unravelled.   
Restrictive idealizations come into play when one assumes that physically possible trajectories, 
either reflecting “unreasonable” interactions with the environment or else arising on account of 
hardware failures, will never occur. For example, path π’= s0, s3, s0, s3,..., s0, s3 , which is allowed in 
the abstract model (KS) of figure 3, corresponds to the odd behaviour engendered by users 
repeatedly opening and closing the oven door (whereby start is true but heat never holds). And a 
malfunctioning oven hardware may give rise to a path π’’: s0, s1, s5, s3, s0, wherein the oven never 
heats up and the states in the sequence are all error states. If these physically possible trajectories 
are taken into account, then the CTL formula 𝑨𝑮(𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 →  𝑨𝑭 𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑡) is  not satisfied in the 
abstract model 𝑀 and the two paths shown above will be advanced as counterexamples together 
with the negative answer to this satisfaction problem. In order to check solely whether the 
controller’s software fulfils given functional requirements, one should discard executions in which 
the violation of the property under examination does not depend on failures of the controller’s 
software. This is usually achieved by imposing suitable fairness constraints. A fairness constraint is 
defined in terms of the set of states that are required to appear infinitely often in any travelled 
path of the KS and is expressed in terms of CTL formulas on a par with property specifications.13 
Models satisfying fairness constraints are idealized models in that fairness constraints can be 
identified with ceteris paribus clauses imposed on the model behaviour, whereby one assumes the 
correct functioning of hardware components (Angius 2013). Fair KSs may still be used to develop 
full-fledged mechanistic descriptions of computing systems carrying out computations satisfying 
the functional constraints expressed by the KS, insofar as one is only making the false assumption 
that some physically possible trajectories which are not relevant to explain software functional 
properties, will never occur. This can be achieved in the micro-oven example (a) by dropping the 
fairness constraints concerning hardware failures or unreasonable interactions with the 
                                                          
13 A  path is fair in case it satisfies each CTL fairness formula infinitely often, and a fair KS 𝑁 = (𝑆, 𝑆0, 𝑅, 𝐿, 𝐹) is also 
defined by a set 𝐹 ⊆  2𝑆 of fairness constraints. A fairness constraint avoiding that unfair path be travelled by the 
model checking algorithm exploring the KS of Figure 3 may be given by the formula 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 ∧  𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒 ∧  ¬ 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 which, 
when satisfied by some fair path, require that the system will eventually enter a non-error state. Considering a fair KS 
𝑀° for the microwave oven, 𝑀° ⊨𝐹 𝑨𝑮(𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 →  𝑨𝑭 𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑡) if there exists a fair path starting from an initial state, 
that is, witness π’’’= s0, s1, s5, s3, s6, s7.  
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environment, and  (b) by adding lower-level descriptions of the micro-oven physical components 
and their physical processes. 
Permissive idealizations come into play when one includes in the model trajectories that fail to 
represent actual execution paths of the system that one is modelling.  Some of these unrealistic 
trajectories, however, are quite relevant to the BECS explanandum, unlike those excluded by 
means of restrictive idealizations. In particular, consider a KS allowing for spurious paths that do 
not match actual program executions. Permissive idealizations of this kind can be introduced by 
the abstracting function from the program variables to the set of abstract functional variables, 
which usually increases the granularity of the KS, so that  each state in 𝑆 is a macrostate 
corresponding to many actual program states. A very simple case is illustrated in Figure 4 wherein 
abstract path 𝜋° = 1°, 2°, 3°, 4° is a spurious path in that it does not represent any software 
execution represented by transitions between states in the set {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12}. Each 
abstract state is obtained by the collapse of three different program states and among those fine-
grained states one may rather find executions from state 1 to state 9 and from state 7 to state 12. 
The collapse of both state 7 and state 9, together with state 8, into the abstract state 3° is 







Fig. 4: A spurious abstract path. 
After checking that 𝑀 ⊨  𝑨𝑮  (𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 →  𝑨𝑭 𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑡), spurious paths of this sort may be outputted, 
together with a positive answer, as elements of the set of witnesses. Some argue that idealized 
models in science should be de-idealized, in order to restore the empirical adequacy of the model, 
after using the distorted model for some representational or explanatory purposes (McMullin 
1985; Weisberg 2013). However, a spurious path does not jeopardize locally the empirical 
adequacy of the KS, that is, its empirical adequacy with respect to the temporal formula to be 
checked for satisfiability in the KS. The spurious path needs to be removed if it corresponds to a 
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false counterexample (or false negative), insofar as counterexamples are used to remove errors 
from the checked faulty program. In such cases, the granularity of the KS is decreased until one 
isolates the faulty modelled transitions, this process being known as abstraction refinement (Wang 
et al. 2006). If the spurious path does not correspond to a false counterexample, there is no need 
to remove it from the KS,  for the satisfiability of the temporal formula under examination is 
independent of the presence of the spurious path. In particular, if the formula 𝑨𝑮  (𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 →
 𝑨𝑭 𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑡) is positively model-checked, the observed behaviours of the micro-wave oven fulfilling 
the liveliness property under consideration are correctly predicted and explained by reference to a 
model (the KS) allowing for system runs that the actual micro-wave oven cannot perform.  
Spurious paths are introduced as a by-product of principled approaches to reduce the amount of  
computational resources one has to allocate in order to carry out the model checking procedure. If 
one is interested in the temporal ordering of two system’s properties (such as those 
corresponding to labels 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 and 𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑡), and transitions are given between the program’s states 
where one property holds and states where the other property holds, then one can idealize the 
system’s representation as if there were one single transition between two macro states. Spurious 
paths need not be removed if the idealized representation allows one to successfully check the 
other temporal formulas of interest. If false counterexamples are traced by the model checking 
algorithm, spurious paths are removed to check whether the property is still violated by the 
revised model or not.  
In conclusion, KSs and other state transition systems that are used in model checking to explain 
correct BECS are models that are built by making extensive use of abstractions and idealizations. 
Both abstractions and idealizations are often needed to decrease the state space of the resulting 
model and to make an exhaustive search in the set of system trajectories computationally feasible. 
Abstractions from program variables to macrostates in the model hide physical descriptions of 
entities and activities of the full-fledged instantiating computational mechanisms. It was argued in 
the previous sections that by adding to an abstract model information about  physical role fillers in 
computational mechanisms one does not necessarily increase the explanatory force of 
explanations that are based on the abstract model. In this section, we have illustrated the practice 
of introducing idealizations which distort computational models by assuming that some 
“disturbing” processes that are involved in the actual computational mechanism do not take place 
(restrictive idealizations), or by introducing processes that are not to be found in the actual 
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computational mechanism (permissive idealizations).  Accordingly, BECS explanations relying on 
models obtained by permissive idealizations are locally tailored to the (liveliness) property P under 
examination. And the underlying model cannot be developed in order to serve a variety of 
additional explanatory purposes, insofar as the model cannot accommodate some downward 
expansions of what-how hierarchies – so as to include functional specifications of microstates and 
their transitions, in addition to full-fledged descriptions of their role fillers that are couched in the 
language of physical theory.  
6. Conclusions 
Explaining BECS is a pervasive and significant activity in computer science practice. An examination 
of this activity was carried out above with the aim of addressing the methodological issue of what 
it is to explain observed incorrect BECS, and to explain regular behaviours that some classes of 
engineered computing systems are capable of manifesting. Both notions of correct and incorrect 
BECS have been clarified on the basis of sets of specifications prescribing desired behavioural 
properties of interest. Users, programmers, engineers, and other stakeholders furnish 
specifications that are organized into hierarchies of what-how descriptions – wherein each 
description affords a functional specification for lower-level descriptions, and the descriptions at 
the bottom layer of the hierarchy include structural details about the physical devices 
implementing logic circuits and gates.  
Explanations of both correct and incorrect BECS can be given using as explanantia specifications 
that one finds at various levels of the what-how hierarchy, without necessarily including 
descriptions of the physical role fillers that one finds at the bottom level and that are couched in 
the language of physical theory. Accordingly, explanations abstracting away from descriptions 
provided at the bottom level of what-how hierarchies  provide adequate answers for a wide 
variety of explanatory requests arising in computer science practice. In the language of 
mechanistic approaches to explanation, this means that in various circumstances, explanations 
that are based on abstract mechanism schemata, rather than full-fledged mechanism descriptions, 
are to be preferred on the multiple grounds of explanation correctness, relevance and 
intelligibility.  
The present analysis of combined abstraction and idealization in BECS explanations may prove 
useful to evaluate, from a methodological perspective, explanatory strategies that one adopts in 
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areas of scientific inquiry that are collected under the name of “software intensive sciences” 
(Symons and Horner 2014) insofar as one makes extensive use of computational methods there. 
Notably, model checking and other formal verification methods are being profitably used to 
perform in silico experiments in systems biology and to explore exhaustively the trajectories in the 
state space of simulated biological cell systems (Fisher and Henzinger 2007; Angius 2015). There, 
computational models provide abstract and idealized descriptions of cell systems, which are used 
to predict and explain a variety of cell behaviours. However, an extensive use of permissive 
idealization in executable cell biology may give rise to multiple and possibly incompatible models 
(Weisberg 2007) of cell systems, whose respective representational, predictive, and explanatory 
roles must be properly understood in the broader scientific context of systems biology.  
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